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ABSTRACT
This article presents the results of a questionnaire survey sent
to a sample of automobile manufacturers in the United States
and Japan (including Japanese-managed plants in the United
States) during the spring of 1990. The data support
observations that Japanese and U.S. practices tend to differ in
key areas and Japanese suppliers perform better in dimensions
such as quality (defects) and prices (meeting targets, reducing
prices over time); and that Japanese-managed auto plants
established in the United States have, in general, adopted
Japanese practices and receive extremely high levels of quality
from Japanese as well as U.S. suppliers. These findings provide
evidence that Japanese practices and performance levels are
transferable outside Japan and suggest that considerable
improvements are possible for U.S. suppliers supplying U.S. auto
plants. In addition, the survey indicates that U.S. firms have
adopted at least some practices traditionally associated with
Japanese firms, apparently reflecting some convergence toward
Japanese practices and higher performance levels in supplier
management.
1. Introduction
Supplier relations and management are crucial areas for any firm that
subcontracts portions of components design and production because of the
dependence this creates on the skills of outside organizations. An automobile,
for example, contains approximately 15,000 components, only a few of which
companies choose to produce in-house. As a result, to obtain the best quality
parts at a given price, managers must decide whether to promote long-term
relationships and mutual cooperation with suppliers, extending from product
development to manufacturing, rely on shorter-term contracts and competitive
bidding, or pursue more in-house development and manufacturing (Abernathy
1979; Monteverde and Teece 1982). It follows that effective supplier relations
are equally important and potentially more difficult for firms that attempt to
locate abroad in order to increase access to foreign markets, take advantage of
different cost factors, or exploit other elements of flexibility stemming from
multi-domestic or integrated global operations (Kogut 1985, Bartlett and Ghoshal
1987, Ghoshal 1987, Porter 1987).
This article presents the results of a questionnaire survey sent to a sample
of Japanese as well as U.S. automobile manufacturers (including Japanese-
managed plants in the United States known as the "transplants") during the
spring of 1990, covering models introduced primarily during 1987-1988. The
study pursued three general questions: (1) Did reported differences in supplier
relations and management, as well as performance, appear in a comparison of
Japanese auto plants with U.S. auto plants for an identical set of components
and, if so, why? (2) For the same set of components, did significant
differences appear between the Japanese and the transplants in the United
States, or between the transplants and U.S. firms, and, if so, why? And (3)
what do the analyses indicate regarding effective supplier management in
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general and as part of a globalization process for production, procurement, and
design operations?
In brief, the research supports observations that Japanese and U.S.
practices, while increasingly similar in several respects, still differ in key areas,
with Japanese suppliers performing better in quality (defects) and prices
(meeting targets and reducing prices over time). On the other hand, Japanese
firms have managed to persuade or help Japanese and American suppliers in the
United States to meet Japanese standards or practices for quality and pricing.
These findings suggest that Japanese efforts to transfer their management
practices to overseas suppliers are succeeding, although the transplants are
relying as much or more on the movement of Japanese suppliers to the United
States as on their managerial skills. In addition, the survey provides evidence
that U.S. automakers and suppliers have adopted at least some practices
traditionally associated with the Japanese, thus indicating a possible
convergence toward a "Japanese model" of supplier management, including higher
levels of performance. At the same time, however, U.S. firms supplying U.S.
auto plants still have room to improve, especially in raising quality and
restricting price increases.
2. Reported Differences in Practice and Performance
A review of recent studies comparing Japanese and U.S. approaches to
supplier management suggested several differences among the three groups of
plants. This section summarizes major observations from the literature.
Number and Type of Suppliers
A common point made by various researchers has been that the degree of
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vertical integration, or the percentage of components manufacturing, assembly,
and even product development done in house, differed between automakers in
the two countries. American automakers, with the exception of Chrysler,
appeared to be more vertically integrated than the Japanese, although the
Japanese appeared to buy a variety of components, rely on fewer parts suppliers
than their U.S. counterparts, and have closer relations with these suppliers
(including integration of suppliers with factory production systems through
"just-in-time" deliveries, extensive information exchanges, and cooperation in
product development). The Japanese also appeared to be organized more in a
pyramid structure, with many more affiliated suppliers that each had their own
suppliers, creating a high level of "group" integration. In contrast, U.S.
automakers seemed to buy more lower-level components and have several
independent suppliers for each component, with supplier selection mainly by
competitive bidding (Altshuler et al. 1984; Cusumano 1985, 1988; Temple, Barker,
and Sloane 1987; Mitsubishi Research Institute 1987; Asanuma 1988b; Helper
1989a, 1989b; Nishiguchi 1989; Lamming 1989).
Length and Stability of Relationships
Numerous studies indicated that the relationships between buyers and
suppliers in the Japanese auto industry tended to be longer term and more
stable than in the U.S. industry. Not only did many relationships date back to
before World War II (Cusumano 1985), but Japanese automakers seemed to
continue purchasing new components from the same suppliers after model
changes, although without formal guarantees of extending their contracts beyond
an initial two or four years. In addition, Japanese automakers appeared to
select their suppliers through competitive bids in the product-development stage
(at which point the buyers had alternative sources) and then rate suppliers
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periodically by the value of their products (for example, quality and price),
continuing business contacts with those who scored high (Asanuma 1988a, 1988b;
Nishiguchi 1989). In the United States, automakers reportedly set contracts for
one year at a time and tried to locate the least expensive suppliers through
annual competitive bidding (Asanuma 1988b, Lamming 1989). In a few
exceptional cases, large parts manufacturers supplying system components
received implicit long-term commitments, but U.S. automakers at times reneged
on these implicit contracts (Helper 1989a; also, see White 1971).
Role in Product Development
Researchers have categorized the role of suppliers in product development
into three modes: (1) suppliers that develop parts on their own as standard
products (supplier-proprietary parts); (2) suppliers that do the detailed
engineering for parts based on functional specifications provided by automakers
(black-box parts); and (3) suppliers that produce parts developed by automakers
according to the buyer's detailed specifications (detail-controlled parts).
According to a research project at the Harvard Business School, there was a
sharp contrast between Japanese and U.S. practices according to these
categories. Black-box parts accounted for 62% of a sample of Japanese
components (measured as a percentage of total procurement costs), with
approximately 50% of the product engineering carried out by suppliers, whereas
U.S. automakers undertook 86% of the engineering, using detail-controlled parts
for 81% of their components (Clark 1989; Fujimoto 1989; Clark and Fujimoto
1991).
Another study found that Japanese suppliers became involved in product
development earlier than their U.S. counterparts (Asanuma 1988b). Japanese
firms also appeared to push suppliers to make a greater commitment to
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technological improvement, giving Japanese automakers more effective product
development than the U.S. counterparts. Clark (1989) even estimated that
supplier involvement accounted for one-third of a significant Japanese advantage
in total engineering hours required to develop a new automobile (1.2 million in
Japan, compared to about 3.5 million in the United States and Europe), and four
to five months of the Japanese advantage in lead time, the number of months
required to complete and deliver a new product (43 months in Japan, compared
to 58 months in Europe and 62 months in the United States).
Pricing Practices
Pricing practices drew attention as an area that constituted perhaps the
most striking operational differences in purchasing behavior between U.S. and
Japanese auto producers. Traditionally, American automakers seemed to rely
more on direct market forces among suppliers (competitive bidding) and the
Japanese more on subtle and indirect forms of competition, utilizing what they
have called "target pricing." Japanese automakers reportedly set a target price
for each part based upon the sales price for the new car model, and then urged
and helped suppliers reach their targets (Cole and Yakushiji 1984; Nishiguchi
1989). Researchers also reported that Japanese automakers negotiated semi-
annual reductions in part prices throughout the model life-cycle, based on the
notion that suppliers should be able to reduce their costs through experience
and continual efforts to improve their product designs, materials, and
manufacturing methods. In the United States, though automakers used price
bidding to pressure suppliers to lower prices, they also seemed to allow
suppliers to pass wage and other cost increases back to the buyers for as long
as the contract continued (Asanuma 1988b; Lamming 1989).
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Quality Management
A study by the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association of parts
imported from American suppliers and parts made in Japan showed that the
defect rates for U.S. imports was 0.35% to 2.6%, compared to 0% to 0.01% for
parts from Japanese suppliers in Japan (Mitsubishi Research Institute 1987).
Because their level of defects was close to zero, Japanese automakers generally
did not inspect incoming parts and thus saved on inspection labor and well as
losses from the cost of defects. Various authors have attributed this level of
quality to management practices that required suppliers and the automakers
themselves to examine, on a continual basis, defects found in designs, materials,
and manufacturing methods, customer responses to products, employee training
and involvement in problem solving, and other areas of operations (Cole 1979;
Cusumano 1985; Sei 1989; Nishiguchi 1989). In contrast, not only were U.S.
defect levels higher, but U.S. firms seemed to rely more on the detection of
errors after-the-fact rather than prevention of problems, with less systematic
efforts to learn from their experiences with defective parts or diffuse quality
responsibility among all employees (Temple, Barker, and Sloane 1987; Helper
1989a).
Information Exchanges and Suggestions
Mutual information exchanges and problem solving through suggestions
from the Japanese automakers to suppliers appeared to stem from the stability
and closeness of relationships, active participation of suppliers in product
development, as well as effective cost and quality management practices in
general. The Harvard researchers documented information exchanges in various
phases of product development, finding that Japanese auto projects overlapped
more activities and exchanged information more frequently through formal and
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informal mechanisms (Clark, Chew, and Fujimoto 1987; Clark 1989; Fujimoto
1989; Clark and Fujimoto 1991). Helper (1989a) identified different responses to
problems arising in buyer-supplier relationships and measured the degree of
administrative coordination and commitment, arguing that the practices of
higher vertical integration and ending relations with poorly performing suppliers
gave American automakers strong bargaining power but did not encourage
technological progress. Nishiguchi (1989) also described the Japanese
"problem-solving" orientation as opposed to the "bargaining" orientation of
American firms, noting that Japanese suppliers pursued continuous cost
reductions and quality improvement.
Summary
Table 1 summarizes key differences between supplier management and
performance among Japanese and U.S. automakers discussed in recent literature.
It should be emphasized, however, that many observers noted the dynamic
rather than static nature of the industry, with U.S. producers possibly moving
closer to Japanese practices, while Japanese producers established U.S. plants
that required them to manage U.S. suppliers. Existing research based on
quantitative data and statistical comparisons also had limitations. For example,
Cusumano (1985, 1988) measured vertical integration but only provided historical
descriptions of supplier-management practices. The Harvard study (Clark, Chew,
and Fujimoto 1987; Clark 1989; Fujimoto 1989; Clark and Fujimoto 1991) focused
on product development and supplier involvement, rather than exploring the
details of supplier-management practices. Mitsubishi Research Institute (1987)
provided quantitative data on various dimensions but relied on small samples of
interviews and secondary sources, with no statistical analyses, as did Altshuler
et al. (1984), Cole and Yakushiji (1984), Temple, Barker, and Sloane (1987),
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Asanuma (1988a, 1988b), Lamming (1989), and Sei (1989). Nishiguchi (1989)
collected some primary data but mainly on the flexibility of suppliers'
manufacturing systems, again with no statistical analysis. Helper (1989b), while
analyzing a broad set of quantitative data on supplier relationships, only
covered facilities in the United States.
Table 1: Reported Differences in U.S.-Japanese Supplier Management
Dimension U.S. Japanese
Number of Suppliers Many Fewer
Integration/Supplier Types Many in-house Many affiliated
Length of Relationships Shorter Longer
Length of Contracts Shorter Longer
Length of Part Transactions 1 year 2 or 4 years
Selection Criteria Price Quality, price, etc.
Role in Development Smaller Larger
Pricing Practices Competitive bids Target prices
Price Changes Upward Downward
Defect Rates Higher Lower
Quality Improvement Lower Higher
Information Exchanges Lower Higher
Suggestions to Suppliers Few Many
Sources: References in Section 2 of this article.
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3. Survey Methodology and Sample Characteristics
To collect quantitative data on the areas listed in Table 1 and then
compare supplier management practices and performance between Japanese and
U.S. plants as well as with Japanese factories in the United States, from
January to March 1990 we carried out a questionnaire survey of auto
manufacturers in the United States and Japan. In addition, to aid in
understanding key issues faced by Japanese firms moving into the United States,
this research project included interviews with 49 managers, engineers, and other
personnel at four Japanese transplants and 23 Japanese suppliers in the United
States (see Section 6 and Appendix 3).1
Units of Analysis
Before selecting components to compare, interviews and analysis of other
research suggested that we adopt several criteria to ensure comparability of the
data. First, we believed the survey should examine a variety of parts, to
reduce the possibility of idiosyncratic answers dependent on the type of part.
We thus considered black-box parts (detailed designs done by suppliers) and
detail-controlled parts (detailed designs done by the automakers), as well as
components for the exterior and interior of a vehicle, and parts made of metal,
electrical, and plastic materials. Second, we decided to exclude highly complex
and critical parts or subassemblies, such as engines and transmissions, that
Japanese transplants were mainly importing from Japan. Third, we decided to
exclude parts that American automakers usually produced internally.
After these considerations, we chose four kinds of parts: shock absorbers,
front seat assemblies, gauge (meter) assemblies, and instrument panels. These
1 We also discussed the survey with approximately one dozen managers at
U.S. automakers to convince them to cooperate in the questionnaire or to
clarify specific questions.
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represented components of moderate technical complexity in that they were not
so complicated that automakers were unlikely to subcontract design or
manufacturing, while, at the same time, they were not so simple that
automakers could completely ignore the details of the designs. The number of
parts in an automobile and the limited scope of the survey make it difficult to
determine whether responses for these four components represent common or
standard practices for the surveyed automakers and suppliers. However, the
components chosen avoid unique or critical parts that might not represent
standard practices. In addition, statistical tests, discussed in the text and in
Appendix 2, indicate that most responses were not sensitive to the part type.
Analyzing suppliers in this manner presented other difficulties that have
placed limitations on this study. For example, relationships may differ for each
car model even within the same companies and over time. Areas with no
significant differences between Japanese and U.S. practices or performance
levels could provide evidence either for convergence or the inaccuracy of
reported differences. These and other issues are treated where appropriate,
although the questions asked and the data gathered appear adequate at least to
explore whether differences existed in several key dimensions among the three
groups of auto plants surveyed. Table 2 lists the data collected.
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Table 2: Data Collected in the Questionnaires
Question# Dimension
1.1 Model market segment (subcompact, compact, mid-size, full-size)
1.2 Model production volume
1.3 Model year (time of market introduction)
2 Number of suppliers
Types of suppliers (internal division, affiliated, independent)
3 Length of contract and business relations
4 Frequency of changing suppliers
5 Supplier selection criteria
6.1 Role of suppliers in product development
6.2 Stage of supplier involvement in development
7.1 Target price ratio
7.2 Price change rate
7.3 Rationale behind price increase/decrease
8.1 Defect rate
8.2 Defect rate change over time
9.1 Information possessed by the buyers about suppliers
9.2 Suggestions made by the buyers to suppliers
Note: #See Takeishi 1990: 71-78 for the actual survey questions.
The Sample
To fill out the survey, we approached the three U.S.-based automakers
(General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler), the five largest Japanese automakers
(Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mitsubishi, and Mazda), and six Japanese transplants in
the United States managed by the same Japanese firms. We identified one
manager responsible for purchasing and product planning in each firm and asked
them to fill out a questionnaire for one or more models, with a promise of
confidentiality such that no data would be associated with particular firms.
Each respondent decided the number of models and which models to include.
The survey, therefore, reflects not a random sample but data on four
components we selected for models chosen by managers at the largest
automakers in the United States and Japan. These data may also represent
either "best practices" or models for which the managers had sufficient
information to answer the questionnaire.
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Table 3 summarizes the response rate and other characteristics of the
sample. One U.S. firm and two Japanese firms chose not to respond. Upon
reviewing the survey results, several questionnaires also contained incomplete or
unclear answers, or data that seemed unusual based on information we had
obtained in interviews or from other reports; these we returned to the
respondents, who then sent clarifications or corrected surveys back. Another
difficulty was that some managers, especially from U.S. firms, did not collect
data for all four parts. For example, there are only two responses for gauge
assemblies in the U.S. sample, although the other three parts are more evenly
balanced across the three groups.
Table 3: Sample Description
Key: SA = shock absorber; GG = gauge assembly; ST = front seat assembly;
IP = instrument panel
Automakers Models## Parts Analyzed
Group (Average
Contacted Responses Model SA GG ST I P Total
Year)
U.S. 3 2 (66%) 11 (1987) 7 2 7 6 22
Japan/U.S.# 6 5 (83%) 6 (1988) 6 6 6 6 24
Japanese 5 3 (60%) 7 (1987) 7 7 7 6 27
Total 13 10 (71%) 24 (1987) 20 15 20 18 73
Notes: #Japanese-managed transplants, which include two joint ventures with
American automakers.
##The number of models reported on in the survey and the average
calendar year of model introduction. The range of models for
the U.S. firms was 1982-90, for Japan/U.S., 1988-89, and for the
Japanese, 1982-89. Profiles of models are shown in Appendix 1.
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As seen in Table 2, the questionnaire also collected information on each
model's market segment, production volume, and year of introduction as control
variables to determine if the size, customer focus, or newness of the product
had any impact on the responses. Once again, these factors were insignificant
except in a few cases, as noted. In addition, for each question, we asked
respondents to list a degree of confidence in their answers; as discussed in
Appendix 2, only on one of 17 questions did the responses from a group appear
less than confident.
4. Survey Results
The data thus consist of responses to 17 questions regarding the four
components. This section compares the three groups of automakers in the
following order: U.S.-based auto plants, Japanese-managed transplants in the
United States (abbreviated as "Japan/U.S."), and Japanese auto plants in Japan.
Number of Suppliers
Table 4 indicates the number of suppliers (including internal parts
divisions) per part for each model. In all but one case, auto plants procured
the four parts as subassemblies. Excluding the exception, the average number
of suppliers per part is 1.8 for the U.S. automakers, 1.2 for the Japanese
transplants, and 1.3 for the Japanese automakers. Though the number for the
U.S. producers still exceeds those for the other two groups, cases of procuring
from only one supplier account for 59% of the U.S. sample; this suggests that
U.S. automakers did limit the number of suppliers per part, in contrast to
reports that they always had many suppliers for each component. In addition,
Japanese firms did not always have sole sources for single components.
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Units:
Table 4: Number of Suppliers Per Part 2
Frequency distributions and means for number of suppliers per part.
Percentages indicated in parentheses.
No. of U.S. Japan Japan Total
Suppliers /U. S.
1 13 20 19 52
(59.1) (83.3) (70.2) (71.2)
2 3 4 8 15
(13.6) (16.7) (29.6) (20.6)
3 3 0 0 3
(13.6) (0) (0) (4.1)
4 1 0 0 1
(13.6) (0) (0) (1.4)
5 1 0 0 1
(4.6) (0) (0) (1.4)
> 5 1# 0 0 1
(4.6) (0) (0) (1.4)
Total 22 24 27 73
(100) (100) (100) (100)
Mean ab 2.8 1.2 1.3 1.7
Mean## a b* 1.8 1.2 1.3 1.4
Notes: #Refers to one automaker using 25 suppliers for the seat assembly.
The means calculated excluding the one exceptional case of 25
suppliers for the seat assembly.
a = U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at .10
a** = U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at .01
b = U.S. and Japan difference significant at .10
b* = U.S. and Japan difference significant at .05
2 The statistical test used to determine the differences among the two or
three means in this and other tables, except as noted, was the Fisher's PLSD
(Protected Least Significant Difference) test (Snedecor and Cochran 1986: 232-
236). For additional details of the statistical tests for this and other tables, as
well as the appendixes, see Takeishi 1990.
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Type and Origin of Suppliers
Table 5 compares supplier type by financial affiliation and country of
origin. Companies were asked to identify the key supplier for each part,
defined as the supplier that provided the largest percentage of the cost or
value of the part. The large number of categories and the relatively small
sample resulted in inconclusive statistical tests and thus it is not possible to
generalize about this variable. For this sample, nonetheless, the data indicate
that 50% of the major suppliers for the U.S. automakers were internal parts
divisions while 45% were independent U.S. suppliers; 5% (1 supplier) was from
West Germany.
For the Japanese automakers responding to the survey, merely 7% of their
suppliers were in-house divisions; 33% were affiliated firms (defined as minimum
20% equity ownership) and nearly 60% were independent. These numbers appear
consistent with previous reports of higher levels of vertical integration for U.S.
automakers in contrast to more outside suppliers for the Japanese. The
responses from the transplants resembled the Japanese in the low level of
vertical integration, but with far more reliance on U.S. suppliers. Fully 87.5%
of their suppliers for the four components were based in the United States.
Half of these were Japanese and only 37.5% U.S.-owned, although the Japanese
automakers in Japan used no U.S. suppliers for this set of components.
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Table 5: Type and Origin of Major Suppliers
Units: Frequency distribution of number of
percentages in parentheses.
major suppliers#;
U.S. Japan Japan Total
/U.S.
Supplier Type/Location
Internal 10 3 2 15
(50) (12.5) (7.4) (21.1)
Affiliated## 0 1 9 14
/Japan (0) (4.7) (33.3) (19.7)
Affi i ated 0 5 0 1
/U.S.A. (0) (20.8) (0) (1.4)
Independent 0 2 16 18
Japanese/Japan (0) (8.3) (59.3) (25.4)
Independent 0 4 0 4
Japanese/U.S.A. (0) (16.7) (0) (5.6)
I ndependent 9 9 0 18
U.S./U.S.A. (45) (37.5) (0) (25.4)
Other 1 0 0 1
(5) (0) (0) (1.4)
Supplier Origin/Location
U.S./U.S.A. 20 9 0 29
(100) (37.5) (0) (40.8)
Japanese/U.S.A. 0 12 0 12
(0) (50) (0) (16.9)
Japanese/Japan 0 3 27 30
(0) (12.5) 100) (42.3)
Total 20 24 27 71
(100) (100) (100) (100)
Notes: #A major
the
supplier is defined here as the supplier that accounts for
largest portion of a part number by value procured by the
automaker .
##An affiliated supplier is defined as one in which the automaker
owns at least 20%° of the supplier's outstanding shares.
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Length of Contracts and Business Relationships
Table 6 indicates the length and stability of supplier relationships. First,
in terms of the average contract length, the U.S. sample is the shortest (1.7
years), followed by the Japanese transplants (2.5 years) and the Japanese (3.2
years). The frequency distribution, shown in Table 7, reveals that most U.S.
contracts (nearly 82%) in this sample are short-term (1 year). Japanese
contracts covered a broad range, although the most common contract (62% of
the sample) is 4 years, corresponding to the average model life-cycle. The
Japanese transplants had 50% 1-year and 50% 4-year contracts, indicating a
mixture of Japanese and U.S. practices.
Although contract length differs among the three groups, the actual
duration of part purchases appears more uniform. As seen in Table 6, for each
group, the average duration of the part transaction (the length of time for
purchasing a particular part for a specific model from the same major supplier)
is almost equivalent to the model life-cycle (the model life-cycles were shorter
for the Japanese than the U.S. automakers but shortest for the transplants,
which had slightly newer models on average). Responses to a question on how
often the automakers changed suppliers are also consistent with this finding.
No automaker changed a supplier for the parts surveyed after the model's
market introduction. 3
3 It is still possible U.S. automakers conduct competitive bidding every
year when their 1-year contracts end, although interviews of the U.S.
respondents who use -year contracts indicated that, in 16 of 17 cases, they did
not carry out any competitive bidding after market introduction. These results
strongly suggest that, although the average contract length for U.S. automakers
is shorter than for Japanese automakers, the actual duration of purchasing parts
for specific models is as long and as stable as in Japan.
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Table 6: Length of Contracts, Transactions, and Model Life-cycles
Units: years, number of times
parentheses
suppliers changed, number of observations in
U.S. Japan Japan Total
/U.S.
Length of 1.7 2.5 3.2 3.0
Contract (22) (16) (26) (64)
Length of Part 3.2 1.6 3.5 2.8
Transaction a*c (21) (24) (27) (72)
Length of Moddd 3.6 1.7 3.1 2.7
Life-cycle (20) (24) (27) (71)
No. of Times 0 0 0 0
Suppliers Changed (21) (24) (27) (72)
Notes: a* = U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at
a** = U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant atb** = U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at
= Japan/U.S. and Japan difference significant at .01
c = Japan/U.S. and Japan difference significant at
18
.05
.01
.05
.01
111
Table 7: Length of Contracts
Unit: years, number of observations, percentages in parentheses
Contract Length U.S. Japan Japan Total
(years) /U.S.
0.5 0 0 3 3
(0) (0) (11.5) (4.7)
1 18 8 2 28
(81.8) (50.0) (7.7) (43.8)
2 0 0 4 4
(0) (0) (15.4) (6.2)
4 1 8 16 25
(4.6) (50) (61.5) (39.1)
5 3 0 0 3
(13.6) (0) (0) (4.7)
8 0 0 1 1
(0) (0) (3.9) (1.6)
Total Observations 22 16# 26 64
(100) (100) (100) (100)
Average Length b** 1.7 2.5 3.2 3.0
(years)
Notes: #Two Japanese transplants (8 cases) do not define the length of
transaction period in the contract.
b** = U.S. and Japan difference significant at .01
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A related issue is the total duration of the business relationships between
the automakers and their suppliers, including any part transactions for any
model (that is, for parts and models in addition to those described in the
questionnaire). As seen in Table 8 as well as Table 7, most of the relationships
tended to be long-term, and neither U.S. nor Japanese automakers changed
suppliers for these parts. 4 Only the transplants tended to have short-term
relationships, although this reflected their short history of operations, with all
plants established during the early or mid-1980s.
Table
Unit: years, number of
8: Length of Business Relationships
observations, percentages in parentheses
Relationship U.S. Japan Japan Total
(years) /U.S.
<2
3 to 5
5 to 10
> 10
Total Observations
0
(0)
0
(0)
4
(18.2)
18
(81.8)
22
(100)
6
(26.1)
6
(26.1)
6
(26.1)
5
(21.7)
23
(100)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
27
(100)
27
(100)
6
(8.3)
6
(8.3)
10
(13.9)
50
(69.4)
72
(100)
4 Even excluding the 12 cases where suppliers were internal divisions (for
U.S. automakers only), 80% of the cases (8) were for more than 10 years and
20% (2) were for 5 to 10 years.
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Supplier Selection Criteria
To examine potential criteria used to select suppliers for each of the four
parts, the questionnaire asked respondents to rate nine factors we selected in
the order listed in Table 9 on a five-point scale (5 = very important, 1 = not
important) or specify and rate other factors of their own choosing. The
results, rather surprisingly, indicate that, whereas common impressions of U.S.
automakers might have them place more emphasis on prices and costs rather
than quality and delivery capabilities, the Japanese respondents placed a higher
emphasis on initial prices offered and target-pricing capabilities in the
development process.
The largest gaps between the U.S. and Japanese responses were in the
importance of "past business experience with your company" and "financial
affiliation," factors that the U.S. firms valued more highly, although the larger
role of internal parts divisions for the U.S. producers in this sample (see Table
5) may explain why financial affiliations were more important for them than for
the Japanese. Other significant differences were that Japanese transplants
consider "quality" and "manufacturing capability" more important than do the
Japanese automakers in this sample. All the transplant respondents also rated
quality as very important.
21
III
Table 9: Supplier Selection Criteria
Units: Mean score (5-point scale, with 5 = very important and 1 = not
important), number of observations, standard deviations in parentheses
U.S. Japan Japan
/U.S.
Observations: 21 23 27
Criteria
Initial Price Offered b**c* 4.1 4.4 4.9
(1.0) (0.8) (0.3)
Target Price Capability a**b** 4.1 4.7 4.7
(0.8) (0.5) (0.5)
Cost Reduction Capability c 4.1 4.4 4.0
(1.0) (0.7) (0.9)
Quality (Conformance) c* 4.8 5.0 4.7
(0.4) (0) (0.5)
Delivery Capability 4.6 4.7 4.7
(1.0) (0.4) (0.6)
Design/Engineering 4.6 4.7 4.6
Capability (0.5) (0.7) (0.7)
Technological Capability 4.1 4.2 4.4
(0.8) (1.0) (0.8)
Manufacturing Capability c 4.4 4.7 4.4
(0.6) (0.5) (0.8)
Past Business Relations a**b** 4.4 3.1 3.1
(0.8) (1.3) (1.1)
Financial Affiliation ab** 3.8 1.9 2.1
(1.2) (1.2) (1.0)
Notes: a**b**
c
c*
= U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at .01
= U.S. and Japan difference significant at .01
= Japan/U.S. and Japan difference significant at .10
= Japan/U.S. and Japan difference significant at .05
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Timing and Role of Suppliers in Development
Most responses to questions regarding the role of suppliers in product
development, summarized in Table 10, were not statistically significant,
reflecting the limited sample sizes and mix of observations for specific
categories (including many categories with zero observations, as reported in the
frequency distributions). Nonetheless, with regard to timing, for a question
asking automakers how many months prior to the market introduction of a
model they sent out inquiries to suppliers and then selected suppliers, one group
of responses was statistically different at a 10% significance level: the
transplants, which sent out inquiries 33 months before model introduction,
compared to 27 months for the Japanese sample.
Overall, these results suggest that suppliers to U.S. firms play a large role
from an apparently early stage in development, although Japanese suppliers still
play a greater role in design. The ability of the Japanese to send out inquiries
relatively late appears to reflect the extent of their relationships with suppliers
and their dependence on suppliers for detailed design, since nearly all the
Japanese parts were black-box. This interpretation is reinforced by Japanese
responses in Table 8 on the length of business relationships and other research
(Clark, Chew, and Fujimoto 1987; Clark 1989; Fujimoto 1989; Clark and Fujimoto
1991), as well as by more detailed data in the survey.
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Table 10: Supplier Involvement in Product Development
Units: months prior to market introduction, percentages of responses,
average sample size in parentheses
U.S. Japan Japan
/U.S.
(19) (16) (26)
Timing of Involvement
Sending Inquiries* 30.2 32.5 26.9
Selecting Suppliers 25.5 23.8 22.5
Type of Part#
% Black-box 70 64 96
% Detail-Controlled 30 23 0
% Supplier-Proprietary 0 13 4
Stage for Inquiries#
% Before Concept Generation 27 0 0
% Before First Clay Model 18 0 32
% Before Detailed Drawings 55 100 68
Stage for Selection#
% Before Concept Generation 6 0 0
% Before First Clay Model 19 0 12
% Before Detailed Drawings 56 30 28
% Before First Prototype 19 45 60
% Before Pilot Run 0 25 0
Notes: * = Japan/U.S. and Japan difference significant at .05
#Frequency distribution of the sample (There were not enough
observations in each cell to conduct reliable statistical tests for
estimating the probability of differences among the three groups.)
The second part of the same question asked respondents to specify when
suppliers became involved in product development: before completion of concept
generation, the first clay model, the first detailed drawings, the first prototype,
or the pilot run. These results, also reported in Table 10, again show U.S.
suppliers involved earlier than the Japanese, at least on a formal level. In fact,
the Japanese in this sample chose most of their suppliers (60%) after completion
of detailed drawings, that is, before the first prototype. Yet the Japanese, as
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well as the U.S. sample and the transplants, all sent inquiries before this stage.
In addition, since 96% of the Japanese parts were black-box and 4% supplier-
proprietary, there had to exist extensive contacts between the engineering
departments of the suppliers and the Japanese automakers prior to formal
supplier selection, at least to discuss specifications for functions and interfaces
(how parts fit with other components).
Pricing Practices
Two measures that literature and interviews suggested were important to
automakers were the target-price ratio, which reflects how well a supplier
meets a price contracted for (although not necessarily the ability to deliver
components at lower prices or costs), and the price-change rate, which refers
to the average annual price increases or decreases for a part after market
introduction. These figures, reported in Table 11 and Figure 1, indicate striking
contrasts. Japanese automakers in the sample started purchasing new parts at
prices approximately 2% cheaper than initially targeted and these dropped
approximately 2% annually thereafter. The U.S. sample started purchasing new
parts at a price approximately 9% higher than targeted and prices rose
approximately 1% per year thereafter. This contrasts to observations in
previous studies that U.S. automakers have recently started asking suppliers to
reduce prices.
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Table 11: Pricing Practices
Units: Percentages, number of observations in parentheses
Practice IU. S. Japan Japan Total
/U.S.
Targt-Pric*c 109.4 110.7 97.6 104.7
Ratio b c (13) (19) (25) (57)
Pric-Chggc * 0.9 -0.4 -2.1 -0.9
Rate # a * (11) (16) (26) (53)
Notes: #Target-price ratio = (actual part price at market introduction )/
(target price the automaker set when it selected the major
supplier for the part) * 100.
##Price-change rate = the average annual rate of price change after
the market introduction (excluding the price change when the
part's design was changed due to the minor change of the
model).
a* = U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at .05
b**= U.S. and Japan difference significant at .01
c* = Japan/U.S. and Japan difference significant at .01
Figure 1: Target Price Ratio vs. Price Change Rate
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The target price ratio for the Japanese transplants, however, is as high as
for the U.S. sample, and their price-change rate fell in between the other two
groups. 5 Half of the suppliers to the transplants were also U.S. firms, which
in general did not meet target prices as well as the Japanese suppliers.
Nonetheless, the transplants performed somewhat better (significant at the 10%
level) than the U.S. sample, obtaining price decreases from U.S. suppliers
averaging -0.6%, compared to an increase of 0.9% for the U.S. sample. 6
The questionnaire also requested reasons why prices of the four parts
increased or decreased after the model introduction by asking respondents to
check one or more of eight potential factors behind increases and one or more
of eleven factors for decreases. (The respondents could specify other reasons,
but generally did not). The large number of possible reasons and the relatively
small number of observations, as well as the fact that no Japanese firm
reported price increases while 25 reported price decreases, compared to only 2
U.S. firms, made it difficult to compare the results statistically, although
several trends stand out for description. The transplants that reported price
increases (2 observations) attributed these to rising materials costs; this factor
5 A minor factor that contributed to the higher target-price ratios of the
transplants was that their detail-controlled parts averaged a ratio of 128%,
compared to approximately 107% for black-box and supplier-proprietary
components. However, because of the small percentage of detail-controlled
parts for both the transplants (23%) and the U.S. sample (30%), black-box parts
(96% of the Japanese components, compared to 64% for the transplants and 70%
for the U.S. sample), for which the suppliers did the detailed design, had a
much larger impact on target-price ratios. For black-box parts, the Japanese
averaged a target-price ratio of 983%, compared to 107% for the transplants and
110% for the U.S. sample. The difference between the target-price ratios of
the black-box parts for the U.S and Japanese samples are significant at the 1%
level, while the difference between the transplants and the Japanese are
significant at the 5% level.
6 We analyzed both target-price ratios and price-change rates breaking
down suppliers by their origin and location (U.S. suppliers in the United States,
Japanese suppliers in the United States, or Japanese suppliers in Japan). These
results were not different at the 1 0 level of significance except for this one instance.
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was also cited by 83% of the U.S. respondents (6 observations) to explain their
increases, followed by process changes (33% of respondents) and labor costs
(17%). The major source of price reductions was productivity improvements,
cited by 97% of all respondents (32 observations). Other major factors cited
behind price reductions were design changes (76% of respondents), defect-rate
improvements (52%), and process changes (42%).
Quality
Table 12 compares the current defect rate and the annual average defect-
rate change after market introduction. Again, a marked contrast among the
three groups emerges. The Japanese automakers in this sample enjoyed a
decrease in the defect rate of approximately 10% per year as well as received
parts with the lowest defect rate (0.01%), significantly better than the U.S.
respondents. Defect rates for the U.S. automakers also decreased, but the pace
was relatively slow (2% annually) and the mean defect rate was still high (1.8%).
Though the average rate of decrease for the Japanese transplants (0.05%) was
not yet as low as the Japanese, it was also significantly better than the U.S.
rate.
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Table 12: Defect Rates and Defect-Rate Changes
Units: percentages, number of observations in parentheses
U.S. Japan Japan Total
/U.S.
Def ect a**b 1.81 0.05 0.01 0.44
Rate #a**b** (12) (15) (25) (52)
Defect-Rate -1.7 -30.1 -9.5 -11.5
Change a**c** (9) (7) (25) (40)
Notes: #Defect rate = (the number of defective parts / the number of parts
received) * 100.
##Defect-rate change = the average annual rate of defect rate change
after market introduction.
a** = U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at .01
b** = U.S. and Japan difference significant at .01
= Japan/U.S. and Japan difference significant at .01
Figure 2: Defect Rates vs. Defect-Rate Changes
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In addition, the data indicate the transplants were improving much faster
than either the U.S. or Japanese respondents, with defect rates dropping more
than 30% since model introductions. The U.S. plants managed by the Japanese
automakers, therefore, were quickly approaching the Japanese defect levels,
even with their much greater use of U.S. suppliers. Figure 2 presents a graph
of these results. This shows that, while in no U.S. case did the defect rate
improve by more than 10%, in spite of a relatively higher average defect rate,
most of the Japanese transplants and Japanese automakers have improved their
defect rates by more than 10%, even starting with lower defect rates than the
U.S. sample. It thus appears that U.S. automakers, at least in this survey, still
have difficulties matching the Japanese or their transplants in quality as
reflected in component defects.
Table 13 analyzes these rates by the origin and location of suppliers. A
major difference (statistically significant at the 1% level) appeared in the
performance of U.S. suppliers when delivering to the transplants, as opposed to
the U.S. plants. U.S. suppliers provided approximately 0.1% defects to the
transplants compared to 1.8% to U.S. plants. The U.S. suppliers also showed
nearly a 49% decrease in defects, compared to merely 1.7% when delivering to
U.S. firms. Internal parts divisions appeared to have the worst quality in the
sample, although, due to the small number of observations (4 defect rates and 5
for defect-rate changes), the results were not significant statistically.
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Table 13: Defect Rates
percentages, number of
U.S.
and Changes by Supplier Origin
observations in parentheses
Japan Japan Total
/U.S.
Defect Rate#
American Sugliers 1.81 0.11 1.25
in U.S.A. (12) (6) (18)
Japanese Suppliers - 0.01 - 0.02
in U.S.A. (6) (6)
Japanese Suppliers - 0.01 0.01 0.01
in Japan (3) (25) (28)
Defect-Rate Change #
American Sugpliers -1.7 -48.8 - -11.2
in U.S.A. a (8) (2) (10)
Japanese Suppliers - -31.1 - -31.1
in U.S.A. (3) (3)
Japanese Suppliers - -10.0 -9.5 -9.5
in Japan (2) (25) (27)
Notes: #ee Table 12 for definition.
a = U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at .01
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Units:
I
Information and Suggestions
A final set of questions asked respondents to indicate either what type of
information on suppliers they possessed or what types of suggestions they have
given to suppliers. Earlier studies (Mitsubishi Research Institute 1987 and
Fujimoto 1989) served as a guide to select categories.
With regard to information exchange (Table 14), 37% of the Japanese
respondents had more information on the cost of process steps, compared to
both the U.S. and Japanese/U.S. samples, although no group reported high levels
of information in this area and the differences among the three were significant
only at the 10% level. The U.S. auto plants, on the other hand, had more
information on statistical process control (90.5° of respondents) than the
Japanese and Japanese/U.S. respondents, which may indicate a greater emphasis
on this technique at the American firms. The U.S. (85.7%) and Japanese (88.9%)
auto plants also had more information on equipment than the transplants
(52.2%), which the interviews suggested reflected difficulties the transplants had
in obtaining detailed information on their suppliers, in part because of their
shorter histories of relationships. With regard to suggestions made by the
automakers to suppliers, the differences were more dramatic among the three
groups, with the Japanese and the transplants reporting higher numbers for
every category (Table 15). These data indicate a much greater involvement with
suppliers for nearly all aspects of the production process, and nearly identical
practices between the Japanese and the transplants, at least as indicated by this
survey.
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Table 14: Information Possessed on Suppliers by Automakers
percentage indicating possession of information on
number of observations in parentheses
each category,
U.S. Japan Japan
/U.S.
(21) (23) (27)
Production Capacity 95.2 87.0 89.0
General Cost Breakdown 66.7 65.2 51.9
Process Steps Breakdown 57.1 100.0 95.6
Cost of Each Process Step* 14.3 13.0 37.0
Quality Control Program 95.2 91.3 100.0
Stat. Process Control Data** 90.5 47.8 66.7
Equipment Used** 85.7 56.5 88.9
Inventory Level 57.1 52.2 44.4
Notes: *Differences between the 3 groups are significant at .10 (chi-square
test).
*Differences between the 3 groups are significant at .05
Table 15: Suggestions Made by Automakers to Suppliers
Unit: percentage making suggestions in each category, number of
observations in parentheses
U.S. Japan Japan
/U.S.
(21) (23) (27)
Quality Control* 47.6 69.6 77.8
Production Process Changes*** 33.3 56.5 92.6
Cost Reduction 85.7 100.0 100.0
Design Changes 57.1 65.2 59.3
Material Changes* 33.3 69.6 48.2
Equipment Changes*** 0 52.2 18.5
Inventory Control Changes* 19.1 47.8 48.2
Notes: *Differences between the 3 groups are significant at .10 (chi-square
test)
***Differences between the 3 groups are significant at .01
33
Unit:
III
5. Data Summary and Analysis
Table 16 presents an overview of the major findings of the survey as they
relate to issues raised in the literature cited earlier in Table 1. In general, the
results support several of the reported differences between Japanese and U.S.
supplier management and performance. In addition, they indicate that, in key
dimensions, Japanese transplants are managing suppliers more effectively than
U.S. automakers and much the same as Japanese companies in Japan, as well as
receiving similarly high levels of performance in defects and especially defect
reductions, even though approximately 87% of their suppliers were in the United
States (37% were independent U.S. firms and 50% Japanese affiliates). There
were, nonetheless, several differences between the transplants and the Japanese
sample, reflecting the special circumstances and short histories of the
transplants but also difficulties the Japanese encountered in adapting to the
United States. Equally surprising, in several areas, the U.S. sample exhibited
practices that differed from the general views reported in the literature.
With regard to U.S.-Japan differences, as indicated in the literature, the
Japanese had lower levels of internal vertical integration (but more affiliates),
fewer suppliers per part, longer contracts, decreasing prices, extremely low and
improving defect rates, and high levels of information exchange with suppliers,
including frequent offering of suggestions for improvement. For supplier
selection, the Japanese, somewhat surprisingly, placed the highest emphasis on
price; since relationships were clearly long-term in Japan, respondents may not
have felt a need to single out business contacts as a selection factor, although
this result clearly illustrates the importance Japanese firms placed on low prices
from their suppliers, in addition to high and improving quality.
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Table 16: Summary of Main Survey Results
Dimension U.S. Japan/U. S. Japan
Number of Suppliers
Per Part
Integration/Type of
Supplier
Length of Relations
Length of Contracts
Length of Part
Transactions
Selection Criteria
(Emphasis)
Selection Timing
Involvement in
Development
Pricing Practices
Price Changes
More in-house
& U.S. inde-
pendents
Long
(> 10 yrs. )
Short
(1.7 yrs.)
Long
(3.2 yrs.)
Past contact,
affiliation
Early
70% black-box
30% detail-
controlled
Above target
(109%)
Increasing
(+0.9%)
Affiliated
U. S./Japan
U.S. inde-
pendents
Short
(1-4 yrs. )
Longer
(2.5 yrs.)
Short
(1.6 yrs.)
Price &
quality
Earliest
64% black-box
23% detail-
controlled
Above target
(110%)
Decreasing
(-0.4%)
Independent &
aff i i ated
Japanese
Long
(> 10 yrs. )
Longest
(3.2 yrs.)
Longest
(3.5 yrs.)
Price
Latest
96% black-box
4%6 supplier-
proprietary
Below target
(98%)
Decreasing
(-2.1%)
Defect Rates
Defect Rate Change Decreasing
(-1.7%)
Decreasing
(-30.1%)
Decreasing
(-9.5%)
Information Exchanges Low, mainly
statistical
process
control
Higher,
more on
process
steps
Higher,
more on
process steps,
and costs
Supplier Suggestions
Most
(1.8)
Fewest
(1.2)
Fewer
(1.3)
High
(1.81%)
Low
(0.05%)
Lowest
(0.01%)
Few Many Many
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The transplants closely resembled the Japanese in these dimensions but
departed significantly in other areas. The transplants utilized many more
suppliers based in the United States, reflecting their locations; they had shorter
part transactions, a result of their briefer histories. They were very early in
sending inquiries to suppliers, reflecting again the newness of their operations.
They had much higher levels of detail-controlled parts, following the U.S.
rather than the Japanese practice, apparently because they had not established
sufficient relationships with suppliers to delegate much detailed design. In
addition, the transplants closely resembled the U.S. sample with part prices
approximately 10% over target, compared to 2% below target in Japan. On the
other hand, the transplants led the entire sample in the rate of quality
improvement, with defects dropping 30% since the model introductions, compared
to decreases of 9.5% in Japan and merely 1.7% for the U.S. sample. While it is
somewhat surprising that suppliers were so far above the target prices for the
transplants, the data (as well as interviews and other research discussed in
Section 6) indicate that the transplants also emphasized a combination of price
and quality, and tolerated higher prices, at least temporarily, to receive higher
quality (higher, in fact, than U.S. automakers received from U.S. suppliers).
Additional data analysis supports another contention: that U.S. automakers
have moved closer to what may be considered a more Japanese approach to
supplier management. Because of the small size of the sample for individual
groups and the small number of models in individual years, especially prior to
the mid-1980s, the individual model year was not significant as a control
variable. However, dividing the Japanese and the U.S. responses in half--
models introduced before 1987, which did not include any transplant models, and
models introduced after 1986 -- make it possible to explore changes during this
period (Table 17).
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Table 17: Early Versus Later 1980s' Comparisons
Units: See Tables 4,6,9,11,12,15
U .S. Sample Japanese Sample
Pre-87 Post-86 Pre-87 Post-86
Average Sample Size 8 10 7 20
Performance Variables
Target price index 105.0* 116.4* 100.7 97.6
Price change % 2.38** .148** -2.08 -2.07
Defect rates 2.60 1.37 .014 .008
Defect rate change % -. 590 -1.73 -14.3 -7.58
Descriptive Variables
Suppliers per part 4.75 1.42 1.00 1.40
Contract length 1.00 1.58 3.08 3.25
Suggestion index 2.75 2.46 4.00 4.80
Supplier Selection Criteria
Initial price offered 3.63 4.36 5.00 4.90
Target price ability 3.88 4.27 4.43 4.75
Quality 4.75 4.82 4.58 4.75
Past relations 4.63 4.27 3.29 3.05
Financial affiliation 4.13 3.91 1.86 2.25
Notes: All variables above showed significant differences at .10 between the
pre-1987 and post-1986 responses for the combined sample. Pre-87 =
responses on models introduced before 1987; Post-86 = responses on
models introduced after 1986
* = difference significant at .10
** = difference significant at .05
While no significant departures appeared for the Japanese, two for the
U.S. sample indicated that: (1) U.S. suppliers missed target prices by a wider
margin for models after 1986; and (2) U.S. suppliers substantially decreased their
rates of price changes following market introduction for models after 1986.
Other differences were not large enough to be statistically significant at usual
levels, and some were difficult to interpret (such as declines in U.S.
suggestions). Overall, however, responses sorted for the early versus the later
1980s suggested that U.S. automakers were moving closer to the Japanese not
only in controlling price increases but also in other directions: decreasing
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defects and improving quality; lowering the number of suppliers per part while
lengthening contracts; placing more emphasis in supplier selection on initial
prices offered and capabilities for meeting target prices and quality; and paying
less attention to past business relationships or financial affiliations.
Several simple correlations also existed among specific practices and
performance measures. First, as seen in Table 18, companies that sent out
early inquiries and made early selections of suppliers -- primarily the
transplants and the U.S. automakers (see Table 10) -- had more difficulty
keeping to target prices after the start of mass production, apparently because
of problems in foreseeing rises in materials costs, as noted earlier. Since the
Japanese had relationships of 10 or more years with each supplier (see Table 8),
some level of informal relationships clearly preceded the formal parts contracts
and this makes it difficult to interpret the relevance of formal inquiries and
selection. However, later inquiries and selection of suppliers may have given
Japanese automakers and suppliers a better sense of factors such as materials
costs that affect their ability to meet price targets.
Second, more frequent price increases, which occurred more with suppliers
to U.S. automakers (see Table 11), were strongly associated with high defect
rates as well as with fewer suggestions to suppliers and shorter contracts.
These findings are consistent with notions such as that U.S. suppliers to U.S.
automakers may be revising prices upward as a reflection of their shorter
commitments to specific prices; they may be charging more for intensive
inspection or quality-assurance activities; or they may still not be receiving as
much guidance on quality improvement and cost reduction as Japanese suppliers
receive from Japanese firms.
Third, early inquiries to suppliers were associated with reductions in defect
rates. This may reflect efforts on the part of the transplants and U.S.
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automakers to work with suppliers early to improve quality, even if prices rise.
Other correlations in Table 18 tend to reinforce the notion that firms closely
coordinated inquiries and selection of suppliers with suggestions and information
on suppliers.
Table 18: Simple Correlation Matrix:
Performance Criteria and Selected Descriptive Variables
Unit: Correlation coefficients
N = 30 (43 out of 73 cases deleted with missing values)
TPR PCR DR DRC SUP CL INQ SEL INF SUG
TPR 1.000
PCR -. 155 1.000
DR -. 022 .712* 1.000
DRC -. 391 -. 051 .180 1.000
SUP -. 237 .339 .040 .146 1.000
CL -. 030 -. 420** -. 366* .222 -. 007 1.000
INQ .529* -. 160 -. 183 - .538* -. 088 -. 158 1.000
SEL .476* -. 274 -. 062 -. 215 -. 222 -. 193 .858* 1.000
INF .020 -. 175 -. 072 .318 -. 030 -. 212 .165 .293 1.000
SUG .335 - .456* -. 354 .151 .066 .244 .470* .471* .539* 1.000
Notes: TPR = target price ratio; PCR = price change rate; DR = defect rate;
DRC = defect rate change; SUP = number of suppliers; CL = contract
length; INQ = stage of sending inquiries to suppliers in the months
prior to market introduction; SEL = stage of selecting suppliers in
the months prior to market introduction; INF = the number of
categories of information possessed on a supplier; SUG = the number
of categories of suggestions made to a supplier
* significance level of .01 or higher
** significance level of .05
There were also significant correlations among the performance variables
and selection criteria, although some results are difficult to interpret. In
particular, as seen in Table 19, responses where suppliers had difficulty meeting
their target prices were correlated with emphasis on initial prices, as well as
with cost reduction capabilities, quality, and past business relations; this
suggests (and the interviews tend to support this interpretation) that too much
emphasis on initial prices led to situations where suppliers, recognized for their
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capabilities or past history, submitted low bids and then raised prices after
market introduction. On the other hand, suppliers valued for their initial prices
had fewer price changes. Low defect rates or defect-rate improvements were
also associated with suppliers valued for their initial prices, ability to meet
target prices and reduce costs, and, to a lesser extent, general manufacturing
capability and past business relations.
Table 19: Simple Correlation Matrix:
Performance Variables and Supplier Selection Criteria
Unit: Correlation coefficier
N = 36 (37 out of 73 cases deleted with missing values)
IPO TPC CRC Q DC DEC TC MC PBR FA
IPO 1.000
TPC .117 1.000
CRC -. 177 .463* 1.000
Q -. 160 .541* .397* 1.000
DC -. 207 .350 * * .183 .740* 1.000
DEC -. 218 .612* .182 .208 .299 1.000
TC -. 258 .601* .212 .469* .286 .671* 1.000
MC -. 098 .631* .200 .534* .271 .696* .767* 1.000
P B R -. 278 .000 .559* .165 .135 .027 -. 056 .080 1.000
FA -. 181 .017 .205 .462* .454* .100 .056 .307 .706* 1.000
TPR .550* .075 .525* .337** .317 -. 016 -. 073 .023 .383** .166
PCR -. 597* -. 244 -. 194 -. 014 -. 040 .234 .229 .214 .000 .072
DR -. 454* -. 592* -. 383** -. 110 .133 .109 -. 051 .015 .135 .318
DRC -. 188 -. 346** -. 493* -. 185 .093 -. 267 -. 044 -. 386** -. 347** -. 154
TPR PCR DR DRC
TPR 1.000
PCR .208 1.000
DR .042 .641* 1.000
DRC -. 213 -. 062 .175 1.000
Notes: IPO = initial price offered; TPC = target price capability; CRC = cost
reduction capability; Q = quality; DC = delivery capability; DEC =
design/engineering capability; TC = technological capability; MC =
manufacturing capability; PBR = past business relations; FA =
financial affiliation; TPR = target price ratio; PCR = price change
rate; DR = defect rate; DRC = defect rate change
* significance level of .01 or higher
A* significance level of .05
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6. Interview Findings and Discussion
In addition to the broader U.S.-Japanese comparisons, the data survey and
accompanying interviews present a unique opportunity to assess the practices
and performance of Japanese transplants in the United States compared to their
Japanese parents and U.S. competitors. In particular, interviews conducted prior
to the actual survey at four of the Japanese transplants (including one joint
venture with a U.S. firm) and 23 Japanese suppliers in the United States
(including several joint ventures with U.S. firms) highlighted four sets of
obstacles the transplants and their U. S. -based Japanese suppliers encountered in
meeting their pricing and quality objectives (Table 20).
First were limitations of the transplants themselves. Interviewees pointed
out that Japanese automakers in Japan set low target prices and high quality
objectives for the transplants. In turn, they felt the transplants and their
U.S.-based suppliers had more limited product and process engineering
capabilities than the Japanese, making it difficult to work closely with suppliers
to reduce costs or raise quality. The transplants also had smaller manufacturing
volumes per model as well as shorter histories of operations, compared to the
U.S. or Japanese plants; interviewees felt these circumstances reduced their
ability to negotiate price reductions and left them susceptible to suppliers
claiming they could not meet low target prices.
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Table 20: Obstacles to Transplants' Pricing and Quality Objectives
Categories and Issues
(1) Limitations of Transplants
Limited engineering capability of
Japanese transplants
Limited database for cost analysis
U.S. suppliers' refusal to provide
cost data
Low production volume and short
history of operations
(2) Limitations of U.S. Base
Limited engineering capability of
U.S. suppliers
Limited capability of second-tier
U.S. suppliers
Limited capability of manufacturing
infrastructure (dies, fasteners,
steel, materials, tools, gilding)
Lack of continuous improvement
efforts or programs in U.S. firms
Shortage of U.S. maintenance workers
(3) Quality/Pricing Policies
Higher quality requirements from
Japanese automakers
Higher costs expected for higher
quality at U.S. firms
(4) Profit/Pricing Policies
Higher profit margins charged by
U.S. suppliers
More short-term profit pressures
at U.S. suppliers
No U.S. tradition of price reductions
Company/interview Codes
A2,S1,S9,11,13,15,17
A1,S2
S2,9
A4, S4,6,13,18,23
A1, S3,16,18,19
A4,S1,2,5,6,8,10,11,13,14,16,
20,22,23
S1,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,17,19,23
A1,S2,3,7,12,13,14,15,21
A2,S7,9,17,18
A1,2,S2,5,11,13,16,18,19
A1,4,S 14,16,20
A2,A4,S1,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,15,
16,17,19,21
A4, S6,9,15,16,17,21
A1,A2, A4, S2, S5,6,7,8,10,14
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Note: Company/interview codes are explained in Appendix 3.
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In addition, transplant managers and other personnel complained of limited
cost data about their suppliers, reflecting their much shorter histories of
operations compared to Japanese firms in Japan or U.S. firms but also a
reluctance of some U.S. suppliers to provide proprietary cost data, which made
it difficult for them to estimate whether U.S. suppliers could meet target prices.
This lack of information appears as well in the responses summarized in Table
14; the transplants had no more information on costs than U.S. automakers and
significantly less than the Japanese automakers. The transplants also had
relatively little information on equipment their suppliers used, although their
emphasis on making suggestions to suppliers about equipment (significantly more
so than the U.S. or Japanese automakers) appeared to reflect efforts to
influence or learn more about this aspect of their suppliers' operations.
A second area of concern were limitations related to operating in the
United States. Interviewees believed that U.S. suppliers, owned by Americans
or Japanese, had less engineering capabilities and responsibilities for product
and process development, which Japanese suppliers in Japan seemed to use so
effectively to lower costs. Nor did they feel that U.S. suppliers had programs
for productivity and quality improvement comparable to those in Japan. While
most felt productivity levels were equivalent in the United States and Japan, at
least under Japanese management methods, several cited a shortage of
maintenance workers in the United States, needed to keep equipment operating
efficiently.
Perhaps more seriously, while personnel interviewed at the transplants and
Japanese suppliers in the United States indicated a desire to produce or procure
even more components locally, in response to political pressures as well as
exchange-rate fluctuations, they referred to two specific problems: the
difficulty of finding additional U.S. subcontractors that could meet their quality
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and cost standards (a complaint supported by the quality and target-pricing data
supplied by the transplants); and the inadequacy of the manufacturing
infrastructure in the United States, especially for dies, tools, steel, compound
materials for plastics, paints, fasteners, and gilding.
Third, many interviewees claimed that Japanese automakers, and the
transplants, had higher quality standards than U.S. firms, such as for design
quality (a component's durability) and manufacturing defects. To meet these
higher standards, they claimed that suppliers in the United States, whether
managed by Japanese or Americans, charged higher prices and often increased
prices over initial targets during a model's life cycle. A Japanese researcher
who assisted in these interviews encountered this same finding in an earlier
study of the transplants and their suppliers (Sei 1989). In addition, a case
study of procurement practices at the Toyota-General Motors joint venture
(New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. or NUMMI), written by a former
American quality-control engineer at the plant, claimed that U.S. suppliers set
up special shops with higher quality standards, achieved mainly through more
intensive inspection prior to shipping components, for which they tried to
charge higher prices (Krafcik 1986). This latter report is also consistent with
the survey data and the interviews of transplant managers and other personnel,
and suggested that the operations of U.S. suppliers were not necessarily
improving as a result of the higher quality standards of the transplants.
Fourth, companies appeared to have different philosophies regarding prices
and profits. Interviewees described how Japanese suppliers accepted low prices
and low margins, and then increased their potential margins by reducing prices;
this is suggested as well in Table 11. They claimed, however, that U.S.
suppliers required higher margins, calculated carefully for individual components,
and therefore requested higher initial prices; U.S. suppliers also expected their
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costs to rise rather than fall over time and, accordingly, raised prices above
the targets in the initial contracts. Nor did U.S. suppliers have a tradition of
"burden sharing," explained as special efforts to lower prices that Japanese
suppliers are expected to make if automakers request reductions because of
competitive pressures or other factors. These differences between Japanese and
U.S. pricing practices are important for explaining the survey findings with
regard to target prices as well as price increases, and are consistent with
reports by other researchers (Hiromoto 1988, Kaplan and Atkinson 1989).
7. Implications
The survey data and interviews suggest several implications with respect to
the three questions posed earlier in the Introduction to this article. First,
there clearly exist differences in supplier relations and management practices
between U.S. and Japanese automakers for the sample of firms and components
examined in the survey; at least some differences appear related to performance
and thus should help Japanese firms maintain an advantage over competitors.
For example, U.S. automakers and their suppliers trailed the Japanese in
quality levels, quality improvement rates, pricing or cost accuracy of
components before market introduction, price decreases after market
introduction, use of suppliers as opposed to internal production, subcontracting
of detailed design to suppliers, information on suppliers, and suggestions to
suppliers that affected quality and costs. Pricing differences may reflect that
U.S. suppliers simply require higher profit margins and submit low initial bids to
obtain contracts, before raising component prices after a model enters the
market. Nonetheless, this practice, compared to the Japanese refusal to accept
price increases while working with suppliers to reduce prices over time,
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appeared to place U.S. firms at a disadvantage. Low Japanese target-price
ratios may also reflect initial numbers where suppliers have already taken into
account that Japanese automakers will expect them to reduce prices over time,
although the unusually strong emphasis of the Japanese automakers on price as
the major factor in determining supplier selection would seem to limit the
effectiveness of this strategy on the part of suppliers.
Overall, the Japanese advantages stemming from their operations in Japan
have created an historic, strategic challenge: to replicate this style and level
of supplier management and performance outside Japan and even with non-
Japanese suppliers. The data also reinforce various impressions of the world
automobile industry as dynamic. Despite indications in the literature of very
large differences between Japanese and U.S. firms in supplier management, some
generalizations may have been wrong or inapplicable to this sample. In
addition, U.S. firms appeared to move closer to the Japanese model during the
1980s in several areas. For example, U.S. automakers had long, stable histories
of relations with their suppliers; the average contract lengths they gave out for
components were increasing, as were the average number of suppliers per
component; price increases for components after market introduction were
dropping while quality was improving; past relations and financial affiliations,
such as use of internal parts departments, were becoming less important as
factors in choosing suppliers, while pricing accuracy and quality seemed to be
gaining. These changes indicated that U.S. automakers and suppliers were
becoming more effective competitors, although the Japanese appeared to meet
the new challenges aggressively: Their quality continued to improve much
faster than U.S. quality while prices fell not rose, for example; and the
transplants appeared to manage suppliers almost as well as the Japanese plants
in Japan, which meant they were more effective or received better results, in
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some though not all areas, than U.S. firms.
This latter observation provides a summary response to the second question
regarding comparisons of the Japanese and the transplants or the transplants
and U.S. firms. The major differences between the Japanese plants and the
transplants were an inability of transplant suppliers to meet target prices, good
but still lower components quality than in Japan, less use of suppliers for
detailed design, less information on suppliers, and other differences related to
their short history of operations. The target pricing discrepancy appeared to
reflect the low prices Japanese automakers set in Japan for the transplants
versus what their actual costs or prices turned out to be in the United States,
both as a result of their lapses (such as the cost of controlling design details)
and those of suppliers; in particular, U.S. practices historically permitted price
increases over time. Nonetheless, in using few suppliers per part and long
contracts, working closely with suppliers, and obtaining fewer defects than U.S.
automakers received as well as quality improvements and price cuts after a
model's introduction, the transplants resembled their Japanese parents in most
areas of management style and performance. in fact, suppliers to the
transplants were improving quality at a truly astounding rate, far exceeding
Japanese suppliers though still trailing in absolute levels of defects reported.
The third question posed is more difficult to address: What does the
survey say about effective supplier management in general and in the context of
globalizing operations? Of course, the survey questions dealt with complex
interrelationships that are not always easy to interpret. Nevertheless, several
practices usually associated with Japanese supplier management appear to have a
positive affect on performance, at least as measured in this study. In
particular, longer contracts, suggestions to suppliers, and an emphasis on
accurate target-pricing and cost-reduction capabilities, all seemed to encourage
47
III
high quality, low-cost components.
At the same time, however, Japanese relationships with their suppliers
clearly went beyond formal contracts, which may make it difficult for the
Japanese to use American or other foreign suppliers to the same extent as they
use Japanese suppliers, such as in subcontracting detailed design or managing
against price increases. For example, the Japanese automakers sent out
inquiries and made supplier selections relatively late; this appears to require a
level of confidence in suppliers that supercedes formal agreements or
transactions as indicated by selection dates, especially since other data
indicated the Japanese had long-term relations with a small number of suppliers.
In addition, the Japanese had more specific information on their suppliers'
costs, such as for each process step, compared to the U.S. automakers or the
transplants. While the level of detailed cost information was far from complete
and did not correlate with the target price index, it suggests a relationship that
would make it difficult for Japanese suppliers to bargain with the Japanese
automakers, such as to increase prices over initial targets. The Japanese also
set prices closer to market introduction, which may provide a better sense of
costs, and assisted suppliers in lowering costs. Yet the Japanese automakers
apparently would not accept price increases, which went against common
practices in the United States even though the Japanese exhibited a stronger
adherence to formal price commitments than U.S. suppliers did.
A more detailed examination of suppliers to the transplants raises another
concern: that their performance reflects more a transfer of Japanese suppliers
to the United States rather than a transfer of managerial skills through which
the transplants encourage improvements, such as in cost reductions or quality,
from U.S.-based suppliers. The data in the survey provide some insights into
this issue. On the one hand, half the transplant suppliers for the sample of
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components studied were Japanese firms operating in the United States; just
over one-third (37.5%) were U.S. firms. For this reason, it appears true that a
key and effective strategy for extending Japanese automobile manufacturing
operations abroad has been the large-scale movement of suppliers to the United
States. The higher quality and lower prices that come from Japanese suppliers
in Japan, as well as relationships that allow Japanese automakers to subcontract
large amounts of design, may well be a sufficient justification to continue this
approach.
On the other hand, buying components and assembly services from local
firms has strategic value as well as political benefits when dealing with local
communities and governments, and perhaps customers as well. For this and
other reasons, the Japanese may want to increase the level of involvement of
U.S. suppliers. Information from the survey and interviews as well as in the
literature, such as that the transplants received much higher quality from U.S.
suppliers than U.S. automakers received from U.S. suppliers, even if this mainly
reflected more stringent inspection, indicates that Japanese firms in the United
States can work effectively with U.S. suppliers and that U.S. suppliers are
willing and capable of improvements. Any improvements in cost and quality,
moreover, bode well for U.S. consumers and for the competitiveness of the
American automobile industry in general.
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Appendix 1: Sample by Model Segment and Annual Volume
Units: Number of models, percentages in parentheses
U.S. Japan Japan Total
/U.S.
Segment:
Subcompact 3 8 8 19
(14.3) (33.3) (29.6) (26.4)
Compact 4 16 15 35
(19.1) (66.7) (55.6) (48.6)
Mid-Size 10 0 0 4
(47.6) (0) (0) (5.6)
Full-Size 4 0 0 4
(19.1) (0) (0) (5.6)
Annual Production:
< 100,000 4 4 4 12
(19.1) (16.7) (14.8) (16.7)
100,000-200,000 3 16 11 30
(14.3) (66.7) (40.7) (41.7)
200,000-300,000 12 4 4 20
(57.1) (16.7) (14.8) (27.8)
300,000-400,000 2 0 8 10
(9.5) (0) (29.6) (1.4)
Total 21 24 27 72
(100) (100) (100) (100)
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Appendix 2: Data Sensitivity and Reliability
As in any survey of this type, there exist concerns about both the
sensitivity of the data to foreseen as well as unforeseen biases or interactions
among variables, and the reliability of the respondents. We included several
measures to explore these possibilities and conclude that, with few exceptions,
the data for the three groups appear statistically robust as well as comparable.
First, we were concerned that our selection of four components might
have biased the results. If automakers in the three groups systematically
managed these parts differently, the survey results might reflect management
policies generally consistent for all components or merely differences related to
the type of components. In a few cases, the type of part proved a significant
variable in the analyses; however, as noted in Section 4, these were not
common and did not affect the general results or conclusions of the survey.
Another concern was that, while we chose the components, respondents
would choose models from different segments that would complicate an
interpretation of the answers. For this reason, we asked for information on the
model segments as well as production volumes (Appendix 1). As we suspected,
the model mix differed; U.S. automakers reported on more full-size and mid-size
vehicles, and the Japanese and transplants on more subcompact and compact
vehicles. The U.S. models also had higher average annual production volumes,
which might indicate a general bias toward mass production and low costs.
However, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and chi-square tests for cross tabulation
indicated that, while some minor differences existed, they did not affect the
results reported in Section 4.
For example, information on inventory levels differed by model segments,
where the Japanese and transplants reported on more subcompacts than other
types of models. Differences among the three groups were not significant,
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however, including or excluding subcompacts. Suggestions regarding quality
control also differed by model segment, although excluding the mid-size and
full-size vehicles, which were mainly in the U.S. sample and had lower rates of
suggestions, the U.S. ratio remained significantly lower than for the other two
groups. Other variables (suggestions about design changes, quality control, and
inventory control) proved to be sensitive to model segment but did not affect
the general results of the analysis. Eliminating full-size models from the
analysis also reduced the difference between the average price-change rates for
the U.S. group and the transplants to a level slightly below the 10% confidence
interval, although the difference between the U.S. and Japan responses remained
significant at the 1% level.
With regard to production volume, only a few variables proved to be
sensitive to this attribute, and thus most results of the survey were unaffected.
For example, while the importance attached to the initial price as a selection
criterion for suppliers differed by production volume, the Japanese still placed
more importance on this variable than the U.S. or transplant samples except for
the 300,000 to 400,000 units-per-year segment, where both the Japanese and
U.S. respondents strongly emphasized this variable. In the 200,000 to 300,000-
unit segment, the emphasis of the transplants on this criterion was not
statistically higher than the Japanese respondents. Possession of statistical
process-control data, as well as suggestions regarding changes in materials,
equipment, and inventory control, also showed some sensitivity to production
volume, with a few significant differences becoming insignificant for particular
volume segments. The reason for these results seems to be that U.S.
automakers managed and performed more comparably to the Japanese and the
transplants in their model lines with production levels below 200,000. However,
including the volume segments above 200,000, the majority (nearly 67%) of the
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U.S. models, the differences presented in Section 4 remain significant.
To gain a sense of the reliability of the data, we compared information in
the survey with data from other researchers and our own interviews, and
several times asked respondents to clarify or amend their answers (we found
several mistakes that were obvious because the data did not make sense or were
radically different from other respondents). In addition, for each question in
the survey, we asked respondents to indicate their confidence in their answers
on a three-point scale (1 = very confident, 2 = somewhat confident, 3 = not
very confident). Of the 17 separate questions in the survey, in four instances
each, the U.S. and transplant respondents had significantly less confidence than
the Japanese respondents. This suggests that the data they reported for these
questions may not be entirely accurate, although only in one instance did the
average response from one of the groups appear to be "not very confident."
The U.S. group proved slightly less confident (1.3 score, different at the
10% significance level) than the Japanese and the transplants on one question
asking when they started purchasing from a particular supplier and on another
question asking at what stage in development they selected suppliers (1.67
score, significant at 5%). Both the U.S. and the transplant respondents were
less confident than the Japanese regarding defect rates (1.9 score for the U.S.,
significant at 5%; 1.8 for the transplants, significant at 10%) and defect rate
changes over time (2.6 score for the U.S., significant at 1%; 2.3 for the
transplants, significant at 5%). The transplant respondents were also
significantly less confident (at the 5% or 1% levels) in their answers, compared
to both the U.S. and Japanese respondents, on two other questions: the type of
information possessed on suppliers (1.7 score), and the type of suggestions made
to suppliers (1.6 score).
The interviews provided an additional check on possible inconsistencies or
53
misunderstandings with the survey questions; as indicated in Section 6, the
interviews with suppliers tended to reinforce and elaborate upon the survey
findings. In addition, while the survey focused on the automakers' management
of suppliers, the interviews also offered no indication that information provided
by the automakers' procurement departments did not reflect actual operations at
the suppliers. As discussed, however, the survey findings did, in some areas,
contradict reports in the literature.
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Appendix 3: List of Interviewees
Company Code (Product) Interviews
Automakers
Al (passenger car)
A2 (passenger car)
A3 (passenger car)
A4 (passenger car)*
Suppliers
S1 (seats)
S2 (glass)*
S3 (electrical)
S4 (brakes)*
S5 (electrical)
S6 (electrical)
S7 (plastic)*
S8 (suspension)
S9 (seats)
S10 (fasteners)*
SII (electrical)
S12
S13
S14
S15
(plastic)*
(electrical)
(seats)*
(rubber)*
S16 (brakes)
S17 (electrical)
S18 (suspension)*
S19 (fasteners)
S20 (rubber)
S21 (brakes)*
S22 (plastic)
S23 (radiators)
Interviewee Positions
Executive Vice President
Purchasing Senior Advisor
Vice President, Administration
Administrator, Corp. Communications
Administrator, Administration Dept.
Purchasing Advisor
President
General Manager, Purchasing
Coordinator, Purchasing
Coordinator, General Affairs
Executive Vice President
Representative, Sales and Marketing
Executive Advisor
Manufacturing Manager
Administration Manager
President
Assistant Director
Assistant GM, Marketing and Planning
Account Representative
Senior Manager, Applications
Vice President
Chairman
President
Officer Secretary
President
Staff Coordinator, Purchasing
General Manager, Sales
President
Executive Vice President
Vice President
Vice President
President
President
Vice President, Production & Sales
Administration & Purchasing Manager
President
President
Director of Planning Purchasing
President
Assist. to President, Sales Marketing
Vice President
Vice President, Secretary/Treasurer
Management Staff, General Affairs
President
Executive Vice President
Executive Vice President
Vice President, Purchasing
Sr. Advisor/Operations Materials
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Note: Due to requests for confidentiality the name of companies and
persons interviewed are not identified. * indicates joint ventures of
Japanese and American companies. The interviews were conducted by
Akira Takeishi and Shoichiro Sei (of Chuo University) from January
22 through February 9, 1990.
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